Despite the increased use of fair values in financial reporting, its effect upon contracting costs, such as audit fees, remains unexamined. To address this issue, this paper proceeds in three steps. First, we document that, controlling for other determinants of audit pricing, firms reporting assets on the balance sheet principally at fair value exhibit significantly lower audit fees relative to those that report assets on the balance sheet principally at historical cost. Second, we document that firms reporting assets primarily at level 1 fair values exhibit significantly lower audit fees relative to those reporting assets primarily at level 2 or 3 fair values. However, audit fees for level 2/3 fair value firms are significantly lower than those for historical cost firms, suggesting that the lower audit fees of fair value firms are not solely driven by level 1 fair values, which use observable inputs. Finally, we document significantly higher audit fees for more complex portfolios of fair valued assets, as well as for fair values that are recognized (versus only disclosed). Overall, these results complement previous findings of fair values reducing information asymmetries by documenting that they can also reduce contracting costs such as audit fees. However, the results further suggest that any reduction in contracting costs will vary with salient characteristics of the fair value reporting: the observability of the inputs, the complexity of the portfolio, and recognition in the financial statements versus disclosure in the notes. 
Introduction
This paper examines the effect of fair value reporting upon a major agency or contracting cost: audit fees (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Prior research pioneered by Simunic (1980) documents the magnitude and determinants of audit fees (for a review, see Hay et al. 2006) . Prior research also documents that fair value reporting is both priced by the equity market (e.g., Easton et al. 1993) and has the capacity to reduce information asymmetries across investors (e.g., Muller et al. 2010) . We combine these literatures to investigate how fair value reporting affects the pricing of audit services in three ways. First, we examine the relative impact on audit fees of reporting assets principally at fair value versus at historical cost. Second, we investigate whether differences in the observability of fair value measurement inputs affect audit fees. Third, we analyze other characteristics of fair value reporting that give rise to heterogeneity in observed audit fees.
We begin our analysis by first investigating the relative impact of reporting assets at fair value versus historical cost. To conduct these analyses, we use firms domiciled in the UK for two primary reasons: first, to isolate a country setting in which substantial subsets of firms report assets on the balance sheet at either historical cost or fair value; and second, to minimize institutional differences that can arise from examining samples across jurisdictions.
Within the UK, we identify two relevant company groupings. First, we use manufacturing firms, which report assets on the balance sheet primarily at historical cost. Second, we use investment firms and real estate firms, which both report assets on the balance sheet primarily at fair value. To mitigate the effects of industry differences leading to systematic differences in observed audit fees, we match firms from these three industry groupings using total assets, which prior literature has shown to be the primary driver of observed audit fees. Consistent with expectations of differential audit fees, empirical results reveal that firms reporting assets on the balance sheet at fair value exhibit significantly lower audit fees relative to firms reporting assets on the balance sheet at historical cost, controlling for other determinants of audit pricing.
We next investigate the characteristics of fair value that can lead to variation in observed audit fees, proceeding with two sets of analyses. First, using the sample identified above, we note that investment firms report assets primarily using level 1 fair values, while real estate firms report assets primarily using level 2 or 3 fair values (e.g., Danbolt and Rees 2008) . That is, the fair values for the financial instruments underlying investment firms' assets are more likely to reflect prices obtained from liquid markets, and thus use observable inputs: i.e., level 1 fair values. In contrast, the fair values of real estate firms' main assets typically reflect prices of comparable properties and/or models using property-specific rental streams: i.e., level 2 or 3 fair values. We document that firms reporting assets primarily at level 1 fair values exhibit significantly lower audit fees relative to those reporting assets primarily at level 2 or 3 fair values, consistent with more observable fair value inputs reducing auditor effort and risk involved in validating reported fair values. Second, we focus the analyses solely on European real estate firms, to better exploit measurable characteristics relating to the reported fair values while holding constant the industry. We document that audit fees are higher for more complex fair value portfolios, as well as for fair values that are recognized in the primary financial statements versus only disclosed in the footnotes.
To further assess the robustness of our results, we conduct a number of sensitivity analyses. First, we show that our results hold when we disaggregate our dependent variable, total auditor fees, into its component parts (statutory audit fees and fees for non-audit services) and analyze the components separately.
Second, to mitigate concerns that our results are an artifact of industry differences in audit fees, we validate the results of our first test within a single industry, comparing audit pricing for US real estate firms (which report property assets on the balance sheet using historical costs) versus UK real estate firms (which report property assets on the balance sheet using fair value). This within-industry setting mitigates macro-economic differences that may be correlated with differences in audit pricing across industries. Further, we note that while the US generally is considered to have higher audit litigation risk than other countries, prior research fails to designate the real estate industry as a high risk setting, suggesting that litigation differences are not the primary source of audit pricing differences across the US and UK for this sector. Consistent with our previous results, we document that audit fees are significantly lower for firms reporting property assets at fair value (i.e., the UK firms) relative to those reporting property assets at historical cost (i.e., the US firms).
Third, we examine whether controlling for economic performance leads to stronger alignment of audit fees under historical cost and fair value reporting. Specifically, we identify firm-years corresponding to "bad news" years, alternatively proxied using low market-to-book ratios (e.g., Ramanna and Watts 2010) and negative stock returns (e.g., Basu 1997). We posit that, during such "bad news" periods, there will be stronger alignment (i.e., smaller differences) in audit fees for firms reporting under fair value versus historical cost.
This will occur because firms reporting under historical cost must assess fair values or equivalent measures in the context of impairment tests during such periods, leading to similar audit tasks occurring under both reporting regimes. Consistent with these expectations, we document that during "bad news" years, differences in audit fees for firms reporting under fair value and those reporting under historical cost are smaller relative to non-"bad news" periods.
Finally, we employ alternative matching mechanisms. This includes replicating our primary analyses using a propensity score match, which should better control for non-fair value firm characteristics likely to drive differences in audit fees. It also includes matching based on firms' exposure to tangible assets, defined as property, plant and equipment for manufacturing firms, and investment property for real estate firms. Consistent with our primary analyses, results continue to reveal audit fees that are higher for firms reporting assets at historical cost, and higher for firms using level 2/3 versus level 1 fair values.
Additional sensitivity analyses (e.g., a random effects model; partitioning the sample into large versus small firms; and partitioning the sample into Big N versus non-Big N auditees) also obtain results consistent with our primary analyses.
Overall, the results reveal that reporting assets at fair value (on average) reduces a substantial contracting cost: audit fees. Combined with previous findings that fair value reporting can reduce information asymmetries, these results are consistent with fair value reporting unambiguously increasing social welfare by reducing both information asymmetries and contracting costs. However, the results also suggest that any reduction in contracting costs depends on several salient characteristics of the fair value reporting: whether the inputs used to derive the fair values are observable; the complexity of the asset portfolio measured at fair value; and whether the fair values are recognized in the primary financial statements versus disclosed in the footnotes. Section 2 presents the literature review and hypothesis development. Section 3 presents the research design and sample selection. Section 4 provides the primary empirical results. Section 5 presents sensitivity analyses, and Section 6 concludes.
Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development

PRIOR LITERATURE
Our study builds upon two broad literatures: that examining the drivers of audit fees, and that examining the effects of fair value reporting. There is a substantial literature on audit pricing, with Simunic (1980) among the earliest to provide theoretical and empirical evidence on the determinants of this contracting cost.
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As suggested by Hay et al. (2006) , the determinants of audit fees, assuming a competitive audit market, may be broadly classified into several major categories: client attributes, auditor attributes, and characteristics specific to the audit engagement. Among these categories, client attributes have received the most attention, and commonly reflect the characteristics of size, risk, and complexity. In particular, consistent with theory on audit effort and litigation, audit fees generally have been documented to increase in the client's size (e.g., Simunic 1980) , risk (e.g., Stice 1991), and complexity (e.g., Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997) .
The literature examining the effects of fair value reporting is also extensive, with many papers analyzing the relation of fair values and equity prices. Earlier empirical papers, such as Barth (1994) and Eccher et al. (1996) , exploiting disclosed fair values relating to financial instruments, generally document that such fair values are value relevant: that is, reflected in stock prices. These results are corroborated for different non-financial asset classes (e.g., Easton et al. 1993) . Other studies examine the effect of fair values on information asymmetry, documenting that asymmetry is reduced when fair values are disclosed (e.g., Muller et al. 2010) . More recent studies document that information risk is higher when fair values are based on unobservable inputs (Riedl and Serafeim 2010) .
We build on these literatures in two ways. First, we examine the relative impact of reporting assets at historical cost versus fair value on audit fees. While both the determinants and audit fees and the effects of fair value reporting are extensively examined, no studies have combined these elements to investigate a fundamental question: how does the primary reporting model interact with this contracting cost. Second, we exploit known variation in the characteristics of reported fair values to identify predictable differences in audit fees. 1 We follow Jensen and Meckling (1976) in viewing audit fees as one of the agency costs arising from a contractual arrangement between the owners (principal) and the management (agent) of a firm. Where the principal (agent) hires the auditor, audit fees represent monitoring (bonding) costs. See also Watts and Zimmerman (1986) .
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Our analysis of fair value and audit fees is structured in three levels. First, we assess the incremental impact of reporting assets on the balance sheet principally at fair value benchmarked against reporting assets on the balance sheet principally at historical cost. That is, we examine the difference in audit fees across these two reporting models. The relative effect of reporting under a fair value model upon audit effort, reputation, and litigation risk, is unclear a priori. For example, critics maintain that fair value reporting introduces substantial discretion into management estimates (e.g., Watts 2006; Ramanna and Watts 2010) .
Increased discretion can compound agency costs, leading auditors to increase their assessment of reputation/ litigation risk and, consequently, their efforts to verify fair value estimates. Alternatively, fair values may reduce auditor reliance on management estimates and litigation risk to the extent these values are derived from observable market inputs (such as prices in liquid markets). Accordingly, we make the following prediction: H 1 Audit fees differ for firms with assets primarily reported on the balance sheet at fair value relative to those with assets primarily reported on the balance sheet at historical cost.
Note that prior research suggests that asset structure is less critical to the determination of audit fees than other factors such as financial condition (e.g., Pratt and Stice 1994) , suggesting that differences in asset structure and reporting may not be a primary determinant of audit pricing. These characteristics of fair value reporting lead to the following three predictions:
H 3A Audit fees are increasing in the portfolio complexity of assets reported at fair value.
H 3B Audit fees are higher for assets reported at fair value that are recognized on the balance sheet relative to those disclosed in the footnotes.
H 3C Audit fees are lower for assets reported at fair value derived using external appraisers relative to those that are not.
Research Design and Sample Selection
THE EFFECT OF HISTORICAL COST VERSUS FAIR VALUE REPORTING ON AUDIT FEES
To assess the effect of historical cost versus fair value reporting on audit fees, we employ a sample of UK firms from the period 1993-2009 reporting their assets on the balance sheet principally under either of these two reporting models. Our restriction to the UK setting has the following reasons. First, the UK is unique in allowing identification of large sub-samples of firms that report assets principally under either the historical cost or fair value models. Second, limiting the sample to a single country limits heterogeneity in institutional characteristics that may occur across multiple jurisdictions. Finally, the UK historically exhibits lower litigation risk than the US, suggesting audit pricing is more likely driven by other factors, such as effort. To capture firms reporting assets on the balance sheet principally using historical cost, we include manufacturing firms (SIC = 3xxx): the principal assets for these firms are long-term tangible assets (e.g., PP&E), which are reported under historical cost subject to impairment. To capture firms reporting assets on the balance sheet principally using fair value, we include investment trusts (SIC = 6726) and real estate firms (SIC = 65xx, 6798). The principal assets for investment trusts are financial assets, and the principal assets for real estate firms are property assets; both are reported at fair value on the balance sheet (Danbolt and Rees 2008) .
Following prior research examining the determinants of audit fees, we test H 1 using the following model: 
FV it
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports its assets on the balance sheet principally at fair value in year t, and 0 otherwise (that is, reports its assets principally at historical cost).
Our dependent variable is LogFees, the log of total auditor fees.
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Consistent with prior studies examining the determinants of audit fees, we express the dependent variable in log form to mitigate the effects of non-linear relations with the independent variables (see Hay et al. 2006 ).
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We then include variables assessed in prior research to drive audit fees. We use two primary groupings: characteristics of the audit client, and those of the audit firm. Regarding audit client characteristics, we first include LogTA; as audit effort is expected to increase in the scale of the client, the predicted sign is positive (Simunic 1980) . To capture audit complexity, we include IFRS, Foreign, and NSegm to capture the incremental efforts associated with first-time IFRS adoption, having internationally dispersed operations, and having complex operations. As audit effort is expected to be higher for firms transitioning to This variable is based on Thomson Financial Worldscope data item 01801, Auditor Fees, which comprises fees paid to the firm's auditor for the statutory audit of the financial statements as well as fees paid to the firm's auditor for other services. In section 5.1, we provide sensitivity analyses showing that our results hold when analyzing statutory audit fees and non-audit fees separately in our main tests.
Results are robust to alternatively defining the dependent variable as the log of firm i's year t audit fee less either the mean or median industry audit fee for year t.
IFRS, having more international operations, or having more complex operations, the expected sign on the coefficients for these three variables is positive. We also include ADR to capture additional audit effort or litigation risk arising from exposure to the US capital market through a cross-listing; the predicted sign is positive.
Next, we include variables to capture firm risk, which has been documented to have a positive association with audit fees (e.g., Stice 1991). We include accounting measures of firm performance, both assessed as a continuous variable (ROA) and as a distress indicator variable (Loss); as risk is decreasing in firm performance, the predicted signs are negative and positive, respectively. We then include several balance sheet constructs to capture audit risk. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Hay et al. 2006, 170) , we include Receiv, because receivables may be subject to higher risk of error; the predicted sign is positive.
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We also include Lev; as more leveraged firms face greater financing constraints, the predicted sign is positive. Next, we include Distress and Qualified to capture extreme negative performance;
as firms with negative equity or qualified audit opinions are more likely in distress, the predicted signs for both variables are positive. Finally, we include Volatility to reflect overall equity market risk; as more volatile stock returns reflect riskier firms, the predicted sign is again positive.
The second group of variables includes characteristics of the audit firm. We include BigN to capture perceived higher quality efforts and/or reputational effects of larger audit firms (i.e., the "large audit firm premium"; see Francis (1984) ); the predicted sign is positive.
Finally, we include Yearend to capture the higher fees charged when audits are required during periods of constrained auditor resources (i.e., during the audit "busy season"; see Ireland and Lennox (2002) ); the predicted sign is positive.
Results are unchanged if we alternatively include inventory (measured as inventory divided by total assets), or receivables plus inventory (measured as receivables plus inventory, divided by total assets).
The experimental variable is FV; this captures whether the firm principally reports its assets on the balance sheet at fair value (FV = 1) versus at historical cost (FV = 0). To proxy for firms reporting assets principally at historical cost, we use firms in the manufacturing industry. To proxy for firms reporting assets principally at fair value, we use firms in the investment and real estate industries. Consistent with H 1 , if reporting assets at fair value increases audit effort and risk associated with a firm's asset base, then the predicted sign is positive. Alternatively, if reporting assets at fair value reduces audit effort and the risks associated with auditing a firm's asset base, then the predicted sign is negative. Accordingly, we do not predict the sign for coefficient on FV. We note two features of our research design. First, because the sample spans a number of years, Equation (1) includes year fixed effects to control for changes in audit fees over time unrelated to our experimental variables. Second, because our research design effectively relies on an industry mean shift, we employ a matching mechanism to better align the sample firms across the historical cost and fair value groupings. For our primary analyses, we match using total assets, which has been shown to be the primary driver of audit fees (e.g., Simunic 1980) . Later sensitivity analyses discuss the robustness of results to alternative matching procedures.
THE EFFECT OF LEVEL 1 VERSUS LEVEL 2/3 FAIR VALUES ON AUDIT FEES
To examine the relative effect of fair values derived principally using level 1 (i.e., observable) inputs versus level 2 or 3 (i.e., unobservable) inputs, we use the same sample of firms discussed above, and employ the following regression: (2) where:
FV_1 it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i primarily reports its assets on the balance sheet at fair value based on level 1 (i.e., observable) inputs in year t, and 0 otherwise; and FV_2/3 it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i primarily reports its assets on the balance sheet at fair value based on level 2 or 3 (i.e., unobservable) inputs in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Equation (2) is similar to the previous Equation (1): the dependent variable remains LogFees, and the control variables are defined as above. However, the experimental variable now distinguishes between different degrees of observability of fair value measurement inputs. In particular, FV_1 captures whether the firm principally reports its assets at fair value based on level 1 (i.e., observable) inputs, while FV_2/3 captures whether the firm principally reports its assets at fair value based on level 2 or 3 (i.e., unobservable) inputs. To proxy for firms reporting assets at fair value using level 1 inputs, we use the investment trust industry, which primarily holds financial assets. To proxy for firms reporting assets at fair value using level 2 or 3 inputs, we use the real estate industry, which primarily holds tangible property assets.
Consistent with prior literature, we assume that fair values for financial assets (on average) more frequently reflect level 1 inputs relative to tangible assets (e.g., Danbolt and Rees 2008 where FV_Expos it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i's proportion of assets measured at fair value is higher than the sample median. The proportion is defined as follows: for firms reporting property assets on the balance sheet at fair value, it is the ratio of property fair values to total assets; for firms 7 Further, we note that Equation (2) will allow for interpretation of an "audit pricing hierarchy" regarding asset reporting. That is, FV_2/3 will capture the incremental effect on audit fees associated with moving from historical cost to fair values based on unobservable inputs, and FV_1 will capture the (additional) incremental effect on audit fees associated with moving from unobservable inputs to observable inputs.
reporting property on the balance sheet under historical cost (and thus disclosing property fair values), it is the ratio of disclosed property fair values to the sum of total assets less recognized property at historical cost plus disclosed fair value of property; 
Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results
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Note that we exclude the variables IFRS and Distress from Equation (3) as there is no variation in these variables for the sample of real estate firms used in this analysis. Further, Equation (3) does not include year fixed effects, due to both the low number of total observations and lack of repeated firm observations. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics, presented for the overall sample, the sample of firms reporting assets at historical cost (i.e., manufacturing firms), the sample of firms reporting assets at level 1 fair value (i.e., investment trusts), and the sample of firms reporting assets at level 2/3 fair value (i.e., real estate firms). Focusing on the overall sample, on average 8% of firm's assets are outside the UK, firms have two operating segments, 4% are cross-listed in the US, 22% report losses, 2.8% report negative equity, 1.2% receive qualified audit opinions, and 68% use Big N auditors.
THE EFFECT OF HISTORICAL COST VERSUS FAIR VALUE REPORTING ON AUDIT FEES
-Insert Table 2 about here - The text and the tables report absolute values of t-statistics. 10 The variance inflation factor (VIF) across the specifications does not exceed 4, suggesting muliticollinearity is not an issue (Neter et al. 1985) .
support for H 1 . Specifically, the results suggest that firms reporting assets on the balance sheet principally at fair value exhibit lower audit fees (on average) compared to firms reporting assets principally at historical cost, controlling for other determinants of audit fees.
To better understand the underlying drivers of this difference, we now examine several characteristics of fair values expected to influence audit fees.
THE EFFECT OF LEVEL 1 VERSUS LEVEL 2/3 FAIR VALUES ON AUDIT FEES
Column (3) of documenting that audit fess for firms reporting assets using level 1 (i.e., observable) inputs are lower relative to firms reporting assets using level 2 or 3 (i.e., unobservable) inputs.
Further, the results suggest that the lower audit fees for firms reporting assets at fair value are not solely driven by firms reporting level 1 fair values measured using observable inputs: that is, firms reporting potentially less reliable, level 2/3 fair values based on unobservable inputs also incur audit fees lower than those incurred by historical cost firms.
THE EFFECT OF OTHER FAIR VALUE CHARACTERISTICS ON AUDIT FEES
11 Findings are unchanged when we restrict the sample to include only firms reporting under level 1 or level 2/3 fair values (that is, when we exclude the manufacturing firms reporting assets under historical cost).
Our final set of analyses examines particular fair value characteristics that also may lead to variation in audit fees. Results are unchanged from the individual estimations of columns (1) through (4), except that
FV_Expos is negative but insignificant (t-statistic = 1.66). Together, the results suggest that audit fees are increasing in the complexity of the portfolio being fair valued, as well as when fair values are recognized on the balance sheet (as opposed to disclosed only in the footnotes).
Sensitivity Analyses
ALTERNATIVE MEASUREMENT OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE
In our first set of sensitivity analyses, we address potential measurement error in our dependent variable, LogFees, the log of total fees paid to the firm's auditor. To maintain comparability with much of prior international audit fee research and maximize sample size, our main tests (displayed in NA_Fees as a percentage of total auditor fees are 37% for historical cost firms, 26% for level 2/3 fair value firms, and 44% for level 1 fair value firms. Table 5 displays multivariate results from using the available matched data on statutory and non-audit fees from FAME to repeat the analyses reported in Table 3 .
Substituting the log of statutory audit fees, LogSA_Fees, for the log of total auditor fees, LogFees, as the dependent variable, column (1) (column (2)) displays results for our test of H 1 (H 2 ). With the exception of Lev and Volatility, all coefficients maintain the previous signs and significance levels.
14 Of note, the coefficients on our experimental variables, FV, FV_1
and FV_2/3, maintain their highly significant negative coefficients, although t-statistics are slightly lower than in Table 3 , likely owing to the reduced sample size (N = 1,496 in Table 5 compared to N = 4,143 in Table 3 ). The adjusted-R 2 is higher than in the Table 3 analyses relying on LogFees (77.8%/82.2% compared to 67.4%/78.6%).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 repeat these analyses implementing an additional control for the log of non-audit fees, LogNA_Fees. The coefficients on the control variables are again substantially unchanged. The coefficient on LogNA_Fees is positive and highly significant, corroborating the univariate evidence of a high correlation between statutory audit fees and fees for non-audit services. Consistently, the adjusted-R 2 increases to around 85%. Of primary interest, however, the coefficients on FV, FV_1 and FV_2/3 are again negative and highly significant.
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In summary, these tests show that our evidence of a highly significant negative relation between fair value, fair value input observability, and audit fees reported in Table 3 14 The coefficient on Lev is positive and highly significant in column (1) of Table 5 , whereas it was positive and insignificant in column (2) of Table 3 . The coefficient on Volatility is positive and insignificant in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 , whereas it was positive highly significant in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 . 15 We also repeat our test of hypothesis 1 using NA_Fees as the dependent variable and controlling for SA_Fees (untabulated) . In this case, the coefficient on our experimental variable, FV, is negative but insignificant (coefficient = -0,028; p-value = 0.19). However, our theoretical predictions pertain to the determinants of statutory audit fees, not to those of fees for non-audit services (for the latter, see for example Whisenant et al. 2003) .
(sections 4.1 and 4.2) is not an artifact of our use of total auditor fees as the dependent variable. H 1 and H 2 are also supported when we focus on statutory audit fees and control for fees paid to the auditor for non-audit services.
-Insert Table 5 about here -
HOLDING THE SETTING CONSTANT: WITHIN-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
The analyses of Table 3 comparing the association between audit fees and reporting assets at historical cost versus fair value rely on an industry mean shift to capture the incremental effects of fair value reporting. Although we control for other determinants of audit fees, these findings may be attributable to differences in audit pricing across industries that do not reflect fair value reporting. To provide further evidence, we conduct the following sensitivity analyses.
First, we focus the sample on a single industry: the real estate industry. This setting allows us to isolate two sub-samples of firms: those reporting property assets at historical cost (US real estate firms) versus those reporting property assets at fair value (UK real estate firms). In particular, real estate firms in the US are required under US GAAP to report property assets on the balance sheet at depreciated historical cost; further, industry practice is such that fair values are rarely voluntarily disclosed. In contrast, real estate firms in the UK are required to report property assets on the balance sheet at fair value.
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By contrasting the reporting within a single industry, this within-industry design helps to mitigate concerns that results are driven by non-reporting differences across industries. Further, we note that while audit litigation risk is generally documented as higher in the US versus the UK, the real estate industry is not designated as a "high litigation risk" industry in the US (see, for for firms reporting assets at fair value (i.e., the UK real estate firms), and 0 otherwise (i.e., reporting assets at historical cost; thus, the US real estate firms). Column (1) of Table 6 presents the results. The coefficient of FV is again significantly negative (-0.741; t-statistic = 12.22). Thus, consistent with H 1 , real estate firms reporting investment property assets at fair value report lower audit fees relative to those reporting property at historical cost.
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-Insert Table 6 about here -
HOLDING THE SETTING CONSTANT: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Second, we examine whether controlling for (non-accounting) economic performance leads to greater alignment in audit fees across firms reporting assets at historical cost versus at fair value. Specifically, we investigate whether the previously documented difference in audit fees across firms reporting at historical cost versus at fair value is attenuated during "bad news" periods. During times characterized by financial distress, firms reporting under historical cost must apply impairment tests to their assets, with any write-downs generally being to fair value. Accordingly, the procedures necessary to validate management reporting estimates during "bad news" periods should be similar under both an historical cost (subject to impairment) and fair value reporting model. Thus, we predict that the difference in audit fees between historical cost firms and fair value firms, which we document in Table 3 and section 4.1, will be (partially or fully) eliminated during such "bad news" periods.
To proxy for "bad news," we employ two alternative measures: the market-to-book ratio and stock returns. Accordingly, we designate an indicator variable, Bad_News, which equals 1 when the firm's market-to-book ratio at the end of year t is below 0.75, and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, Bad_News equals 1 when the firm's stock return for year t is negative, and 0 otherwise. We then re-estimate Equations (1) and (2) on our previous sample of manufacturing, investment trust, and real estate firms, interacting our fair value experimental variables with Bad_News. Thus, for Equation (1) we include FV × Bad_News;
for Equation (2), we include FV_1 × Bad_News and FV_2/3 × Bad_News. If differences in audit fees are attenuated during bad news periods, we predict that the coefficient for the interacted variables will be positive.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 present results using the market-to-book ratio. Results on the control variables are similar to those reported previously. In addition, FV, FV_1, and FV_2/3 also remain significantly negative. The coefficient on Bad_News is significantly negative, indicating that historical cost firms' audit fees decrease in bad news periods. Overall, the results suggest that during "bad news" periods, differences in audit fees for firms reporting assets principally at historical cost versus at fair value are reduced.
ALTERNATIVE MATCHING PROCEDURES
Our primary analyses match firms from the manufacturing, investment trust, and real estate industries using total assets. We choose this as our primary matching criterion, due to the prominence of total assets as a determinant of audit fees (for a review, see Hay et al. 2006 ). To provide further assurance that our results are not an artifact of the matching procedure, we employ alternative matching schemes. First, we use a propensity score match, using predicted values from a probit regression of an industry indicator variable on all control variables in Equation (1). This matching procedure maximizes the similarity of matched pairs in terms of our control variables, resulting in two sub-samples which are similar on all non-fair value dimensions shown to affect audit fees. To the extent that Equation (1) captures all major factors affecting audit pricing, propensity score matching is expected to specifically mitigate the influence of industry-specific characteristics, which are unrelated to the research question.
We present the results of re-estimating Equation (1) using the propensity score match in Column (1) of Table 7 . Consistent with our previous results, the coefficient for FV remains significantly negative (-0.974, t-statistic = 12.35) . We then present the results of reestimating Equation (2) using the propensity score match in Column (2). Results are again similar to those previously reported. Specifically, the coefficients for both FV_1 ) are significantly negative, and the difference is significantly positive (1.488, t-statistic = 19.87).
-Insert Table 7 about here -Finally, we alternatively match our firms using the exposure to long-lived tangible assets. Specifically, we include only firms from the manufacturing and real estate sectors, matching based on exposure to tangible assets. For manufacturing firms, this is calculated based on PP&E to total assets; for real estate firms, it is calculated based on investment property to total assets. Results are presented in Column (3) of Table 7 . As previously, the coefficient for FV_2/3 remains significantly negative (-0.426, t-statistic = 2.52). Overall, these sensitivity analyses suggest that the results are robust to alternative matching schemes.
OTHER SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
We perform several other sensitivity analyses. We estimate fully-interacted models to assure that industry characteristics do not affect the coefficients on our fair value variables.
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Specifically, we interact all control variables in Equation (1), except LogTA (which is used for matching), with FV. This analysis allows industry-specific coefficients on the control variables. The coefficient for FV remains significantly negative (coefficient = -1.584; tstatistic = 9.71), as previously reported. We also estimate a random effects model. This specification controls for unobservable firm characteristics that may be correlated with audit pricing. Consistent with the above findings, we continue to find that the coefficient on FV is negative and significant (coefficient = -1.354; t-statistic = 17.21).
Finally, we examine four sample partitions, to ensure that our findings are robust within particular sub-groups of firms. First, we split the sample based on auditor type, replicating our tests for the sub-samples of firms employing Big N auditors versus non Big N auditors. Results are consistent with those reported above; specifically, the coefficient on FV remains significantly negative within each sub-sample. Second, we partition the sample based on auditor industry expertise. We proxy for expertise using a measure of auditor industry concentration (i.e., the proportion of total assets audited by an auditor in each sample). Results are again consistent, with the coefficient on FV significantly negative in each sub-sample. Third, we partition firms based on asset size, defined using median assets; again, the FV coefficient is significantly negative across both sub-samples. Finally, we partition firm observations into pre-versus post-IFRS groupings. Again, we find that the coefficient for FV is significantly negative across both groupings.
Combined, these sensitivity analyses suggest that the lower audit fees for firms reporting assets at fair value relative to historical cost are robust to alternative specifications, and occur across firms employing large or small auditors, firms employing industry expert or non-expert auditors, large or small firms, and firms reporting under UK GAAP or IFRS.
Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of fair value reporting on audit fees. We build on the literatures examining the determinants of audit fees and the effects of fair value reporting by investigating whether the primary accounting model used to report assets on the balance sheet affects audit pricing. We use as our setting firms domiciled in the UK, which allows both identification of large sub-samples of firms reporting assets at historical cost versus fair value, and holds constant institutional features specific to the UK setting. Our sample includes firms matched by total assets from three industries: manufacturing (which report assets at historical cost), investment trusts (which report assets at fair value), and real estate (which also report assets at fair value). Our primary matching technique is total assets, due to the prominence of this variable as a determinant of audit fees.
Our empirical tests provide two insights. First, we find that firms reporting assets at fair value (that is, investment trusts and real estate firms) report significantly lower audit fees relative to those reporting assets at historical cost (that is, manufacturing firms), controlling for other determinants of audit fees. This is consistent with fair value reporting allowing monitors to reduce (on average) this contracting cost, due either to the relatively lower efforts necessary to validate accounting numbers reported at fair value versus historical cost, and/or reduced assessments of litigation and reputation risk. Because the UK reporting environment is generally characterized as having low litigation risk, the results appear more consistent with effort reduction rather than reduced litigation risk.
Second, we hypothesize and find that salient characteristics of fair value reporting lead to predictable differences in audit fees. Specifically, we find that audit fees are higher when unobservable (versus observable) inputs are used to derive fair values, when the asset portfolio complexity is higher, and when the fair value is recognized on the balance sheet (versus disclosed only in the footnotes). All three results are consistent with theory suggesting that auditors increase effort in contexts of greater measurement error, as well as for reporting items likely to receive greater user focus.
Overall, our results suggest that the social welfare associated with adopting fair value reporting appears positive. That is, combined with findings of prior research that fair values appear both relevant to financial statement users and to reduce information asymmetries, our finding that fair value reporting appears to reduce the contracting cost of audits is consistent with net positive benefits arising from reporting of asset fair values. Other contracting costs-such as those associated with debt financing and compensation-we leave to future research.
APPENDIX A Variable Definitions
Dependent Variables
LogFees it
The log of firm i's total auditor fees paid for year t.
LogSA_Fees it
The log of firm i's statutory audit fees paid for year t.
LogNA_Fees it
The log of firm i's fees paid for non-audit services for year t.
Experimental Variables
FV it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports its assets on the balance sheet principally at fair value in year t, and 0 otherwise. This corresponds to firms in the investment trust (SIC = 6726) or real estate (SIC = 65xx, 6798) industries.
FV_1 it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports assets on the balance sheet principally at fair value in year t using level 1 (i.e., observable) inputs, and 0 otherwise. This corresponds to firms in the investment trust industry (SIC = 6726).
FV_2/3 it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports assets on the balance sheet principally at fair value in year t using level 2/3 (i.e., unobservable) inputs, and 0 otherwise. This corresponds to firms in the real estate industry (SIC = 65xx, 6798).
FV_Expos it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i's proportion of assets measured at fair value is higher than the sample median. The proportion is defined as follows: for firms reporting property assets on the balance sheet at fair value, it is the ratio of property fair values to total assets; for firms reporting property on the balance sheet under historical cost, it is the ratio of disclosed property fair values to the sum of total assets less recognized property at historical cost plus disclosed fair value of property. Calculated from hand-collected data.
FV_Complex it
A measure of the complexity of firm i's property portfolio in year t; calculated by summing the square roots of the percentage of property for firm i within each of the following four sectors: retail, office, manufacturing, and other; higher values reflect more complex portfolios by reflecting their diversity across sectors. Calculated from hand-collected data.
FV_Recog it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i recognizes property fair values on the balance sheet in year t, and 0 otherwise (that is, only discloses property fair values in the footnotes).
FV_Ext it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i uses an external appraiser to provide investment property fair values in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
LogTA it
The log of firm i's total assets at the end of year t.
IFRS it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is a first-time adopter of IFRS in year t or t+1, and 0 otherwise.
Foreign it
International assets divided by total assets for firm i for year t.
NSegm it
Number of firm i's operating segments for year t.
ADR it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is cross-listed in the United States for year t, and 0 otherwise.
ROA it
Firm i's net income divided by total assets, both measured for year t.
Loss it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports negative net income for year t, and 0 otherwise.
Receiv it
Firm i's receivables divided by total assets, both measured for year t.
Lev it Firm i's total debt divided by market value of equity for year t.
Distress it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports negative book value of equity for year t, and 0 otherwise.
Qualified it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i receives a qualified audit opinion for year t or t-1, and 0 otherwise.
Volatility it
The standard deviation of monthly stock returns for firm i over year t.
BigN it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i uses a large auditor (i.e., Big 6 or Big 4, depending on the year) during year t, and 0 otherwise.
Yearend it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i has a fiscal year end between December and March (corresponding with the audit busy season) for year t, and 0 otherwise.
Bad_News it
An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i receives bad news for year t, and 0 otherwise. Bad news are defined depending on specification when market-to-book ratio is less than 0.75 or when the firm's stock return for year t is negative.
Descriptive Variables
Fees it Firm i's auditor fees paid in year t (in thousand UK Pound).
Total Assets it
Firm i's total assets at the end of year t (in thousand UK Pound). This table presents the sample selection. Panel A reviews the primary sample, which is used to compare the effect of historical cost versus fair value upon audit fees (Table 3) . This sample includes publicly-traded firms domiciled in the UK during 1993-2009 across three sectors: manufacturing (SIC = 3xxx), which is assumed to report assets on the balance sheet principally at historical cost; investment trusts (SIC = 6726) and real estate (SIC = 65xx, 6798), which are both assumed to report assets on the balance sheet principally at fair value. The final sample uses firm-years matched based on year-end total assets. Panel B presents the secondary sample, which is used to examine the effect of fair value characteristics on audit fees (Table 4) . This sample includes publicly-traded real estate firms domiciled in the European Union reporting under IFRS during 2005-2008. (SIC = 65xx, 6798) . Firms are selected matching on total assets and year. We assume that manufacturing firms report assets on the balance sheet principally under the historical cost model, investment trusts report assets on the balance sheet principally using fair values based on Level 1 (i.e., observable) inputs; and real estate firms report assets on the balance sheet principally using fair values based on Level 2/3 (i.e., unobservable) inputs.
The bottom of the table reports statistics for the secondary sample used to examine the effect of fair value characteristics on audit fees; the N is restricted to real estate firms, with a maximum of 291 observations, depending on data availability. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for the indicated two-tailed tests. Table 3 substituting the log of statutory audit fees, LogSA_Fees, for the log of total auditor fees, LogFees, as the dependent variable (columns (1) and (2)), and additionally controlling for the log of non-audit fees, LogNA_Fees (columns (3) and (4)). All variables are defined in Appendix A. We test hypothesis 1 using the coefficient for the variable FV. We test hypothesis 2 by comparing FV_1 with FV_2/3.
The sample includes firms from Table 3 with the available data on statutory audit fees and non-audit fees from the FAME databank during the 1997-2009. The sample includes 616 manufacturing firms (SIC = 3xxx); 402 investment trusts (SIC = 6726); and 478 real estate firms (SIC = 65xx, 6798). We assume that manufacturing firms report assets on the balance sheet principally under the historical cost model, investment trusts report assets on the balance sheet principally using fair values based on Level 1 (i.e., observable) inputs; and real estate firms report assets on the balance sheet principally using fair values based on Level 2/3 (i.e., unobservable) inputs.
***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for the indicated one or two-tailed tests. Standard errors are clustered by firm. This table presents alternative estimations comparing the effects of fair value versus historical cost on audit fees. The dependent variable is LogFees. All variables are defined in Appendix A, except Bad_News, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 for "bad news," and 0 otherwise. "Bad news" is defined in columns (2) and (3) as a market-to-book ratio below 0.75, and in columns (4) and (5) as negative stock returns.
Column (1) uses the sample of UK real estate firms (SIC = 65xx, 6798) during the period 2002-2009 and a sample of US real estate firms matched by total assets and year. While US real estate firms report property assets at historical cost (per US GAAP), UK real estate firms report property assets at fair value (per UK GAAP). Thus, here FV equals 1 for UK real estate firms, and 0 for US real estate firms. FV is used to provide further support of hypothesis 1.
Columns (2-5) use the sample of firms domiciled in the UK during 1993-2009 across three sectors: manufacturing (SIC = 3xxx), which is assumed to report assets on the balance sheet principally at historical cost; investment trusts (SIC = 6726), which are assumed to report assets on the balance sheet principally using fair values based on Level 1 (i.e., observable) inputs; and real estate (SIC = 65xx, 6798), which are assumed to report assets on the balance sheet principally using fair values based on Level 2/3 (i.e., unobservable) inputs. We test whether accounting measurement of assets have different implications during bad news times versus good news times by using the coefficient for the variable FV×Bad_News, FV_1×Bad_News, and FV_2/3×Bad_News. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for the indicated two-tailed tests. Standard errors are clustered by firm. In columns (1) and (2), firms are selected using propensity score matching. The sample includes firms domiciled in the UK during 1993-2009 across three sectors: manufacturing (SIC = 3xxx), which is assumed to report assets on the balance sheet principally at historical cost; investment trusts (SIC = 6726), which are assumed to report assets on the balance sheet principally using fair values based on Level 1 (i.e., observable) inputs; and real estate (SIC = 65xx, 6798), which are assumed to report assets on the balance sheet principally using fair values based on Level 2/3 (i.e., unobservable) inputs..
Column (3) uses the sample of European real estate firms over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] with available hand-collected data and a matched sample of European manufacturing firms. The matching is done by country, year and the ratio of property to total assets, resulting in 291 observations of real estate firms and 80 observations of manufacturing firms. We define property as net property, plant and equipment for manufacturing firms and as investment property for real estate firms. We assume that manufacturing firms report assets principally at historical cost, and real estate firms report assets principally at fair value. Thus, FV equals 1 for European real estate firms, and 0 for European manufacturing firms.
***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for the indicated one or twotailed tests. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
